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The Library of Babel for Prior Art:
Using Artificial Intelligence to Mass
Produce Prior Art in Patent Law
Artificial intelligence is playing an increasingly important role in the
invention and innovation processes of our society. To date, though, much of the
academic discussion on the interaction of artificial intelligence and the patent
system focuses on the patentability of inventions produced by artificial
intelligence. Little attention has been paid to organizations that are seeking to
use artificial intelligence to defeat the patentability of otherwise patent-worthy
inventions by mass producing prior art. This Note seeks to highlight the
consequences of allowing mass-produced, AI-generated prior art to render
valuable inventions unpatentable. Specifically, this Note concludes that AIgenerated prior art decreases the incentive for researchers to disclose valuable
knowledge through the patent system without providing an adequate substitute
source of such knowledge. This Note also examines a number of patent law
doctrines that should, but likely will not, prevent deficient AI-generated prior
art from rendering valuable inventions unpatentable. To resolve these issues,
this Note proposes a solution that modifies the current novelty inquiry and
breathes new life into the patent law doctrine of conception. This solution
advances the patent system’s purpose of promoting technological advancement
while still allowing artificial intelligence to play a large role in that
technological advancement.
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INTRODUCTION
If artificial intelligence (“AI”) publishes a description of an
invention on the internet, but no person, or even the AI itself, recognizes
that the text actually describes a new invention, does society gain
anything from the publication? Probably not. But that same description
could prevent a later inventor from receiving a patent, thus diminishing
the inventor’s incentive to create, disclose, and commercialize the
invention. This could delay or completely prevent the public from ever
benefitting from the invention.
It is no surprise that artificial intelligence will play a major role
in future innovation.1 Around the world, researchers have already filed
patent applications on AI-created inventions, such as a drink container
based on fractal geometry and a device that uses flickering light to
1.
See, e.g., Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of
Patent Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079 (2016) (arguing that creative computers should receive inventor
status and discussing the potential implications that may arise under such an Intellectual
Property regime); Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer
Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up?, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1675, 1681, 1702–03 (1997)
(arguing that the output of creative computers should not receive protection under intellectual
property laws and should enter the public domain instead).
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assist in search and rescue operations.2 Currently though, the U.S. and
European Patent Offices reject patent applications that lack a human
inventor.3 Without the incentive of receiving a patent, there is little
motivation for businesses to invest in AI-produced inventions.4 Yet
these applications may still be useful because, if published, they can
prevent human inventors from obtaining a patent on the same
invention.5 As a result, some organizations are using AI to
indiscriminately prevent others from receiving patent protection for
their inventions rather than using AI to invent.6
These organizations are using AI to algorithmically generate
millions of lines of text, the equivalent of the Library of Babel, 7 with the
hope that some of the text will contain descriptions of new inventions.8
Rather than pursuing patents for these inventions, the entities publish,
or “strategically disclose,” these texts.9 A patent examiner10 may then
use these published texts as prior art—evidence that an invention is
already known to the public or would be obvious to make—which may

2.
Dennis Crouch, USPTO Rejects AI-Invention for Lack of a Human Inventor, PATENTLY-O
(Apr.
27,
2020),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2020/04/rejects-invention-inventor.html
[https://perma.cc/EAE9-4YHL]; Emma Woollacott, European Patent Office Rejects World’s First AI
Inventor, FORBES (Jan. 3, 2020, 7:39 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2020/
01/03/european-patent-office-rejects-worlds-first-ai-inventor/#991508c5cd00
[https://perma.cc/68BM-SQUF].
3.
Crouch, supra note 2; Woollacott, supra note 2.
4.
See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
5.
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (prohibiting patents for inventions that are “otherwise available to
the public”).
6.
See Benefits, CLOEM, https://www.cloem.com/flat/benefits/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/4FB4-EHS3] (offering the production of prior art through artificial intelligence
as a service to prevent others from obtaining patents); About, ALL PRIOR ART, http://allpriorart.
com/about/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/B4ZJ-LZGZ] (“All Prior Art is a project
attempting to algorithmically create and publicly publish all possible new prior art, thereby
making the published concepts not patent-able.”).
7.
The Library of Babel, which is highly analogous to large-scale AI-generation of prior art,
is a fictional library that contains all possible books and, thus, the solutions to all possible
problems. Jorge Luis Borges, The Library of Babel, in COLLECTED FICTIONS 112, 112 (Andrew
Hurley trans., Penguin Books 1999) (1944). But “[f]or every rational line or forthright statement
there are leagues of senseless cacophony . . . .” Id. at 114. “[T]he Library is the greatest imaginable
source of information . . . . But the Library’s vastness and disorganization also make it almost
completely useless . . . .” James Grimmelmann, Information Policy for the Library of Babel, 3 J.
BUS. & TECH. L. 29, 29 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
8.
See Ben Hattenbach & Joshua Glucoft, Patents in an Era of Infinte Monkeys and Artificial
Intelligence, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 32, 35 (2015) (“Cloem is attempting . . . to use brute-force
computing to mechanically compose text for thousands of patent claims covering potentially novel
inventions . . . .”).
9.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
10. Patent Examiners have the primary role of examining patent applications and then
granting or rejecting the applications. Sue A. Purvis, The Role of a Patent Examiner, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. (Apr. 8, 2013), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/about/offices/ous/
04082013_StonyBrookU.pdf [https://perma.cc/N88B-AMTX].
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defeat the patentability of an invention if the evidence meets certain
statutory and judicial requirements.11
The amount of information a piece of prior art must disclose to
defeat the patentability of an invention is notably less than what a
patentee must disclose in a patent application for the patent to issue.12
The divergent standards for patent application disclosure and prior art
disclosure may have been inconsequential with traditional forms of
strategic disclosure. But the increasing presence of AI-generated prior
art exploits these differences to thwart patents from issuing on valuable
inventions while providing fewer societal benefits than traditional
strategic disclosure. This undermines patent law’s goal of incentivizing
the creation and disclosure of new inventions because, as the likelihood
of receiving a patent decreases, inventors may protect their inventions
under less societally beneficial trade secret law or may not invent
at all.13
This Note argues that courts should adapt to AI-generated prior
art by eliminating the existing presumption that prior art is enabling
and by implementing a conception requirement for prior art. Part II
discusses some of the standards for patentability and the disclosure
requirements for prior art and patent applications. Part III analyzes
whether current AI-generated disclosures satisfy the requirements to
be prior art, explains the impact that large-scale AI-generated prior art
has on the patent system, and distinguishes AI-generated disclosures
from traditional prior art. Part IV presents a solution for managing
large-scale AI-generated prior art, not by categorically excluding AIgenerated disclosures from being prior art but by eliminating the

11. See Vic Lin, What Is Prior Art?, PAT. TRADEMARK BLOG, http://www.patenttrademark
blog.com/what-is-prior-art/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/SL9C-5CFR] (“The term
‘prior art’ is frequently used in the patent world to refer to what already exists. It’s the old stuff
that can’t be patented again. Prior art may consist of documents, things and processes that have
been sold or used in the past.”); see also infra Section I.C.1 (discussing the requirements for a
disclosure to be prior art).
12. See Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 936–40 (2011)
(discussing the differences in the standards and burdens of proof for patent-supporting and patent
defeating enablement).
13. Trade Secrets provide less benefit to society because the owner of a trade secret does not
have to provide the public with details about the invention, unlike a patent applicant, who must
provide enough teaching in the patent application to allow others to make and use the invention.
See TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J.,
dissenting) (discussing how incentivizing inventors to keep information secret “denies society the
benefits of disclosure stemming from the patent system, which are anathema to trade secrets”);
Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, Disclosure as a Strategy in the Patent Race, 48 J.L. & ECON. 173,
173–75 (2005) (discussing how firms can retain trade secrets while disclosing enough information
to thwart rival patents).
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presumption that prior art is enabling14 and requiring that all potential
pieces of prior art satisfy a conception requirement before qualifying as
prior art. In doing so, this solution advances the utilitarian purposes of
the patent system of promoting innovation and the dissemination of
information while giving credence to the ability of AI to generate new
and useful information.
I. THE DIFFERING REQUIREMENTS FOR PATENTABILITY AND PRIOR ART
A. The Utilitarian Justification for Patent Law
To understand the problems amplified by large-scale AIgenerated disclosures, it is crucial to understand the purpose of U.S.
patent law. The patent system is predominantly justified on utilitarian
grounds.15 Referred to as the patent law quid pro quo, the patent system
gives inventors a limited monopoly on their inventions in exchange for
disclosing their inventions to the public.16 Without a monopoly,
inventors would be underincentivized to create and disclose their
inventions.17 And without disclosure of the inventions, society may
14. The enablement requirement in patent law often refers to the statutory requirement that
a patent application must teach how to make and use the described invention in order for a patent
to be granted. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (“The specification shall contain a written description . . . of
the manner and process of making and using [the invention], in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the [invention] . . . .”).
However, like patent applications, prior art must be enabling to serve as patentability-defeating
prior art. See infra notes 55–68 (discussing the anticipatory enablement requirement of prior art).
The major difference between anticipatory enablement, the level of enablement required from
prior art, and enablement required from a patent application is that patent applications must
enable an ordinary person in the relevant field to make and use the invention while prior art must
simply teach such a person how to make the invention. In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1405 (C.C.P.A.
1969) (“[Section] 112 provides that the [patent application] must enable one skilled in the art to
‘use’ the invention whereas § 102 makes no such requirement as to [prior art].”).
15. 1 PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 2019: PERSPECTIVES, TRADE SECRETS AND PATENTS 167 (2019).
16. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“The basic quid pro quo . . . for
granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial
utility.” (emphasis added)); Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Refin. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484
(1944) (“[T]he quid pro quo is disclosure of a process or device in sufficient detail to enable one
skilled in the art to practice the invention once the period of the monopoly has expired . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
17. This is because information, unlike tangible property, is nonrivalrous and nonexcludable.
CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 30 (4th ed. 2017). Information is nonexcludable because
once disclosed, it is difficult to prevent others from using it. Id. at 31. Information is nonrivalrous
because many people can benefit from it without preventing others from using it at the same time.
Id. This is because inventors need to disclose and commercialize their inventions in order to recoup
their research and development costs, but an unprotected disclosure would allow competitors to
copy the invention and compete with the inventor. Id. Thus, there is a need to limit access and use
of the information to prevent competition from others who have not invested in the production of
the information. Id. Increased competition from those who did not invest in producing the
information would decrease market prices and result in under-investment in invention. Id. at 35.
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never receive the benefits of the knowledge that a patent application
provides to the public, which allows others to improve upon the
patented invention and grows the general storehouse of knowledge.18
This disclosure function also places a limit on a patent monopoly by
enabling others to make and use an invention once the patent has
expired19 and by preventing the patentee from extending his monopoly
beyond the patent term by keeping details of the invention secret.20
Thus, at the cost of a limited monopoly, the patent system benefits
society by incentivizing the disclosure of new information that
ultimately “foster[s] the cross-pollination of ideas” and “drive[s] [ ] more
creative innovation.”21
B. What Is Prior Art?
As will be discussed in Section II.C, an invention must meet
certain requirements⎯namely, that it be new and nonobvious—before
a patent can be granted.22 Particularly, the invention must be new and
nonobvious compared to the prior art. The term “prior art” refers
generally to the existing body of knowledge in a field from which an
examiner can draw to find that an invention is unpatentable.23 A prior
art reference is a particular piece of evidence that shows what
information was known in the field before a given invention was made.24
Almost anything can be a prior art reference. The categories of prior art
references are enumerated in 35 U.S.C. § 102 and include patents,

18. Id. at 91.
19. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186–87 (1933) (discussing
how the public receives the knowledge of the invention and the ability to practice it after the
expiration of the patent).
20. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 130 (2006).
(discussing how the disclosure requirements prevent patentees from retaining important details
for practicing an invention in the best manner while giving an inferior disclosure to the public).
21. Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 661
(2010).
22. See infra Section II.C.
23. See Lin, supra note 11 (“The term ‘prior art’ is frequently used in the patent world to refer
to what already exists.”). However, the term “prior art” is sometimes used to refer only to prior art
references that can legally be used to support a rejection of a patent application. Gene Quinn, What
Is Prior Art?, IPWATCHDOG, (Oct. 2, 2010), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/10/02/what-is-priorart/id=12677/ [https://perma.cc/7WPM-QXF6].
24. See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Prior Art and Possession, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV.
123, 149, 192 (referring to particular pieces of prior art as references).
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printed publications, and events, like a public use25 or sale26, that make
the invention publicly available.27 Even movie scenes and the Bible can
be prior art references.28
For a prior art reference to be a patentability-defeating prior art
reference—one an examiner can legally use to support the rejection of
a patent application—the reference must meet certain requirements.
These prior art requirements fall into two categories: practical and
substantive. The practical requirements, found in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–
(b), dictate the availability and timing required for a reference or
disclosure to be patentability-defeating prior art against a particular
patent application.29 The substantive requirements dictate the
information or knowledge a disclosure must provide to be patentabilitydefeating prior art.30 The substantive requirements discussed
below, such as strict identity and anticipatory enablement, are
judicial doctrines.31
1. The Practical Requirements
The foremost practical requirement for a disclosure to be
patentability-defeating prior art is that the disclosure was made
publicly available before the earliest effective filing date of the patent

25. A public use includes both public uses by the inventor as well as “any use of [the claimed]
invention by a person other than the inventor who is under no limitation, restriction or obligation
of secrecy to the inventor.” Netscape Commc’ns. Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Petrolite Corp. v. Baker Hughes Inc., 96 F.3d 1423, 1425
(Fed. Cir. 1996)).
26. For the definition of a sale, see Meds. Co. v. Hospira, Inc., 827 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (“[T]o be on sale under § 102(b), a product must be the subject of a commercial sale or offer
for sale, and that a commercial sale is one that bears the general hallmarks of a sale pursuant to
Section 2-106 of the Uniform Commercial Code.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). Note that this list is nonexhaustive of the forms of prior art because
Congress added the phrase “or otherwise available to the public” during the enactment of the
America Invents Act. Compare Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C § 102 (2006) (omitting the phrase “or
otherwise available”), with Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (including the
phrase “or otherwise available”).
28. Stewart Walsh, Prior Borat? Non-traditional Prior Art Rejections!, IPWATCHDOG (Mar.
24, 2012), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/03/24/prior-borat-non-traditional-prior-art-rejections
/id=22837/ [https://perma.cc/6L3E-6MWZ].
29. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b).
30. For example, strict identity requires that a prior art reference contain each and every
limitation of the invention. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325,
1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Anticipation requires the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all
elements of a claimed invention arranged as in the claim.” (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983))).
31. See NARD, supra note 17, at 5–6, 253–56 (discussing the development of these doctrines).
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application at issue.32 The earliest effective filing date may be the actual
filing date of the patent application at issue, or it may be the filing date
of a related patent application.33 While a disclosure or reference may
take many statutorily enumerated forms,34 AI-produced disclosures are
most analogous to the category of “printed publications.” 35 Thus, this
discussion will focus on printed publications.
Public accessibility is the “touchstone” for determining whether
a reference is a “printed publication” under § 102.36 A court will deem a
reference publicly accessible if it was “disseminated or otherwise made
available [so] that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in
the . . . art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” 37 While
disclosures such as academic journals are clearly printed publications,
the analysis is more complicated in cases like a doctoral thesis indexed
in a library, a slide presentation at a conference, or an online article.38
Regardless of form, courts generally interpret “exercising reasonable
diligence” without considering the actual efforts required to access the
information, which allows references that are practically inaccessible to
still qualify as patentability-defeating prior art references.39
For cases in which the disclosure is a document, such as a
doctoral thesis, courts often analyze public accessibility by looking to
see if the disclosure was catalogued in “a meaningful way” in a public

32. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless the claimed
invention was . . . available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention . . . .”).
33. 35 U.S.C. § 100(i)(1).
34. For a list of the statutorily enumerated categories of prior art, see supra note 27 and
accompanying text. Notably, this list is nonexclusive. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b).
35. Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 8, at 37.
36. In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357, 1359 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 224
(C.C.P.A. 1981).
37. Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(quoting SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys. Inc., 511 F.3d 1186, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
38. See NARD, supra note 17, at 292.
39. In many cases where a reference is found to be a printed publication, the circumstances
indicate that it is extremely unlikely that a PHOSITA would have located the disclosure. See, e.g.,
Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 453 F.3d 1352, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J.,
dissenting from denial of petition to hear en banc):
It is undisputed that these cancelled drawings are not available in any database or any
library, and that no index, no catalog, no abstract suggests their existence or their
content. . . . [T]he only way to obtain these drawings (although their existence was
unknown) is to personally go to the Canadian Patent Office in Hull, Quebec, and ask to
examine the file wrapper . . . of this particular patent . . . .;
see also In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 897–98, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that a single thesis deposited
in one German library and indexed in a special dissertations catalogue was “sufficient[ly]
accessibil[e] to those interested in the art exercising reasonable diligence”).
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archive.40 For disclosures that are not printed publications in the
traditional sense, like a poster presentation, the Federal Circuit has
outlined several factors for analyzing whether disclosure was publicly
accessible: the length of time of the display,41 the expertise of the target
audience,42 the existence of reasonable expectations that the display
would not be copied,43 and the ease with which the display could have
been copied.44
For online publications, courts will examine both the indexing of
the disclosure and the circumstances surrounding the disclosure to
determine if it was publicly accessible.45 For example, in Voter Verified,
Inc. v. Premier Election Solutions, Inc., the Federal Circuit found that
an unindexed internet article was still publicly available prior art.46 The
court determined that the article’s availability on a well-known website
dedicated to the invention’s technology field made it publicly accessible
despite it not being indexed in a search engine.47 Thus, for online
publications, indexing is “a relevant factor” but not “a necessary
condition” for an online reference to be publicly available, and courts
will consider other factors.48
2. The Substantive Requirements
To be a patentability-defeating prior art reference under § 102,
a prior art reference must meet two substantive requirements. First,
there must be strict identity between the now-claimed invention and
the invention disclosed in the prior art reference, and second, the prior
40. In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding that student theses indexed
alphabetically by authors name were not sufficiently accessible because indexing bore no
relationship to the subject of the theses). But see In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1314–16 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (holding that databases searchable by keyword, but not databases only searchable by
authors name or first word of the title, were publicly accessible for the contained disclosures to
constitute printed publications); In re Hall, 781 F.2d at 897–98, 900 (holding that a single thesis
deposited indexed in a special catalogue in one German library was sufficiently accessible).
41. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Howmedica, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 846, 860 (D.N.J.
1981) (holding that a limited duration slide presentation did not allow a PHOSITA to make or use
the invention and thus the presentation was not prior art).
42. See Jockmus v. Leviton, 28 F.2d 812, 813–14 (2d Cir. 1928) (stating that a reference may
be a printed publication if it “goes direct to those whose interests make them likely to observe and
remember whatever it may contain that is new and useful”).
43. See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Where professional and
behavioral norms entitle a party to a reasonable expectation that the information displayed will
not be copied, [a court] is more reluctant to find something a ‘printed publication.’ ”).
44. See id. (“The more complex a display, the more difficult it will be for members of the public
to effectively capture its information.”).
45. Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 8, at 37.
46. 698 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
47. Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 8, at 37.
48. Voter Verified, 698 F.3d at 1380.
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art reference must satisfy the anticipatory enablement requirement.49
Strict identity requires a single prior art reference disclose every
limitation50 of the claimed invention, arranged as in the claims of the
patent application at issue. 51 But the reference need not expressly
disclose every limitation of the invention. The inherent anticipation
doctrine softens the strict identity requirement by allowing “a prior art
reference [to] anticipate [a claimed invention] without disclosing [every
limitation] of the claimed invention if the missing [limitation] is
necessarily present . . . in the single [prior art] reference.”52 A limitation
is necessarily present in a prior art reference if it naturally flows from
what the reference explicitly discloses.53 Further, although a single
prior art reference must expressly or inherently disclose all limitations,
an examiner may use secondary references to show that the missing

49. Seymore, supra note 12, at 931.
50. A limitation is any component or part of an invention that the patentee claims as part of
the invention in a patent application. See Andrew Schulman, Patent Litigation Part Three: An
Introduction to Patent Claims, “Limitations,” Infringement, and Invalidity, DISPUTESOFT (Dec. 11,
2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.disputesoft.com/patent-litigation-part-three-an-introduction-topatent-claims-limitations-infringement-and-invalidity/#:~:text=Patent%20claims%20are%
20made%20up,a%20wide%20scope%20of%20infringement [https://perma.cc/W9DH-EETX]. A
patentee may claim a limitation in physical or functional form. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (allowing for
functional claim limitations). For example, a patentee applying for a patent on a new coffee mug
might claim the limitation that the coffee mug “has a C-shaped handle” (physical limitation)
or might claim the limitation that the coffee mug has “means for holding the coffee mug”
(functional limitation).
51. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(“Anticipation requires the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all elements of a claimed
invention arranged as in the claim.” (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548
(Fed. Cir. 1983)). For example, an inventor applies for a patent claiming a chair with the
limitations or elements of a square seat, four legs attached at the corners of the seat, and a seat
back. If the examiner finds a published book describing a chair with a square seat, four legs
attached at the corners of the seat, and a seatback arranged as in the inventor’s patent application,
the book satisfies the strict identity requirement. However, if the book describes a chair having a
round seat, having only three legs, or not having a seatback, the book would not satisfy the strict
identity requirement because it failed to disclose each limitation of the claimed invention. Further,
if the book described a chair with a square seat, four legs, and a seatback, but the legs were not
attached at the corners of the seat portion, the chair would fail the strict identity requirement
because the legs would not be arranged as in the claimed invention.
52. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See also
NARD, supra note 17, at 254 (articulating the test for inherent anticipation to be that “a claim
limitation is inherently anticipated if the limitation is necessarily present in or inevitably flows
from the reference; or, if the reference is an actual device, the claim limitation would necessarily
result from the use of the device for its intended purpose”).
53. Schering Corp., 339 F.3d at 1379. For example, if an invention was described as “a
container having a cap and a body that is waterproof when the cap is secured to the body” it would
naturally flow from the explicit disclosure that a seal exists between the cap and the body. This
seal is inherently present despite not being explicitly described.
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feature was inherently present in a single prior art reference.54 Thus,
the strict identity requirement is not so strict in application.
Second, a reference or disclosure must meet the anticipatory
enablement requirement to be prior art under § 102. Under the
anticipatory enablement requirement, to be prior art, a disclosure must
provide enough knowledge or information to enable a person having
ordinary skill in the art (a “PHOSITA”) to make the described invention
without undue experimentation.55 The anticipatory reference need only
enable a single embodiment of an invention that falls within the
scope of the patent claims in the patent-at-issue to satisfy this
requirement though.56
Requiring that a piece of prior art “enable” rather than “teach”
a PHOSITA to make an invention means that the anticipating reference
does not, by itself, have to “explain every detail” because a PHOSITA’s
knowledge can fill in the gaps in a disclosure.57 Examiners can use
secondary references to show what is within the PHOSITA’s
knowledge.58 Further, whether a prior art reference is enabling is
determined as of the filing date of the application at issue. 59 Thus, even
if a secondary reference arose after a reference or disclosure was made
but before the filing date of the patent-at-issue, an examiner can use
that secondary reference to show that the primary reference was
enabling.60 Therefore, a reference that was not enabling upon
publication may become enabling years later.61
The anticipatory enablement requirement’s ability to filter out
substandard prior art is further diminished because examiners can
presume that prior art references are enabling.62 This means that an
54. See Cont’l Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“To
serve as an anticipation when the reference is silent about the asserted inherent characteristic,
such gap in the reference may be filled with recourse to extrinsic evidence.”).
55. Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing In re
Omeprazole Pat. Litig., 483 F.3d 1364, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
56. Schering Corp., 339 F.3d at 1381.
57. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
58. See In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562–63 (holding that secondary references could be used
to show that a primary reference was enabling); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Disclosure
and Time, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1459, 1477 (2016) (“Non-prior art references can be useful to inform
the background state of the PHOSITA’s knowledge.”).
59. See Holbrook, supra note 58, at 1471 (“Novelty under the AIA is assessed as of the
filing date.”).
60. See id. at 1477 (“[Secondary] references may arise after the prior art reference, so long as
they are prior to or contemporaneous with the appropriate date for assessing novelty
(or obviousness).”).
61. See id. at 1470 (“The time gap between a prior art disclosure and the validity assessment
means that the knowledge of the PHOSITA has an opportunity to grow.”).
62. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re
Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 681 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (citing In re Jacobs, 318 F.2d 743, 746 (C.C.P.A. 1963)).
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examiner can reject an applicant’s claim to an invention without
inquiring into whether the anticipating reference is enabling.63 Thus,
examiners can make a prima facie case of anticipation so long as the
reference satisfies the strict identity requirement.64 The burden then
shifts to the applicant to rebut the presumption of enablement by a
preponderance of the evidence.65 If the applicant succeeds, the examiner
can submit additional evidence to show the prior art reference is
enabling.66 While the examiner has the ultimate burden of persuasion,67
this burden-shifting may continue as each side submits new evidence.68
Notably, a prior art reference needs to satisfy these substantive
requirements only if it is supporting a rejection under § 102 for lack of
novelty.69 An examiner may assert a prior art reference to render a
patent obvious without it meeting the strict identity70 or enablement
requirements for rejections based on a lack of nonobviousness under 35
U.S.C. § 103.71 For the purposes of the nonobviousness requirement,
“[e]ven if a reference discloses an inoperative device, it is prior art for
all that it teaches.”72
C. Ensuring the Patent Bargain
To minimize the “abhorrence”73 of granting a monopoly, there
are several statutory requirements a patentee must satisfy before

63. Amgen Inc., 314 F.3d at 1355.
64. See In re Wilder, 429 F.2d 447, 451 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“[A] prima facie case is made out
whenever a reference is shown to contain a disclosure which is specific as to every critical element
of the appealed claims.”).
65. In re Sasse, 629 F.2d at 681 (citing In re Jacobs, 318 F.2d at 746).
66. Id. (citing In re Payne, 606 F.2d 303, 303 (C.C.P.A. 1979)).
67. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966) (“[T]he primary responsibility for
sifting out unpatentable material lies in the Patent Office.”).
68. See In re Sasse, 629 F.2d at 681–82 (explaining how the burden shifted from the PTO, to
the applicant, back to the PTO, and to the applicant once more).
69. The patentability standards of § 102 and § 103 are discussed below in Section C. Ensuring
the Patent Bargain.
70. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained,
notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section
102 . . . .”) (emphasis added).
71. See Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. Baker Energy Res. Corp., 748 F.2d 645, 652 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (stating, after finding a reference was nonenabled to be prior art under § 102, that it “may
qualify as a prior art reference under § 103, but only for what is disclosed in it.”) (emphasis
omitted). This does not mean that an invention that would otherwise be novelty defeating if it were
enabling can be the sole prior art reference of an obviousness rejection. See Seymore, supra note
12, at 939–940 n.104 (“[A]n examiner cannot rely on § 103 to circumvent the requirement for
enabling prior art. . . . But the prior art as a whole must be enabling, not just a single reference.”
(emphasis added)).
72. Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
73. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1966).
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receiving a patent to ensure the public receives the full benefit of the
patent bargain. These standards include novelty (35 U.S.C. § 102),74
nonobviousness (35 U.S.C. § 103),75 and the disclosure requirements (35
U.S.C. § 112).76 While not the only requirements, these present the
greatest implications for large-scale AI-generated prior art.
1. An Invention Must Be Novel
It is a foundational principle of patent law that only truly novel
inventions—inventions that are not already known, made, sold or
used—are patentable.77 From the utilitarian perspective, if an
invention is already known to the public, then “the public have acquired
nothing from the [disclosure] of the patentee[] which they did not
possess before,” and thus, there is no quid pro quo that justifies the
grant of a patent.78 Granting a patent for an invention that lacks
novelty would actually harm the public by removing existing knowledge
from the public domain.79
A court or examiner will determine whether an invention is new
by comparing the invention to the prior art to see if the invention
already exists.80 If the invention already exists, the invention is not
novel and is “anticipated” by the prior art.81 As stated above, an
examiner must find strict identity between the claimed invention and
an enabling prior art reference to issue a novelty rejection.82

74. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
75. Id. § 103.
76. Id. § 112.
77. See Cridlebaugh v. Rudolph, 131 F.2d 795, 800 (3d Cir. 1942) (stating that the absence of
novelty automatically precludes patentability); Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6 (explaining that
congressional authorization for patents that would remove technology from the public domain
would be unconstitutional).
78. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES § 292 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 2d ed. 1854). Unlike in copyright law,
an inventor cannot obtain protection for an invention that is in the public domain, even if he
independently created an invention. Robert P. Merges, A Few Kind Words for Absolute
Infringement Liability in Patent Law, 31 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1, 20 (2016).
79. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (“[P]atent protection [for]
knowledge that is already available to the public . . . would not only serve no socially useful
purpose, but would in fact injure the public by removing existing knowledge from public use.”).
80. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(“Anticipation requires the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all elements of a claimed
invention arranged as in the claim.” (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548
(Fed. Cir. 1983)). See also supra note 51 and accompanying text (providing relevant examples).
81. See NARD, supra note 17, at 246 (“The novelty requirement asks whether the claimed
invention is new. If an invention is not new, it is said to be anticipated by the prior art.”).
82. See supra Section I.B.2.
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2. The Nonobviousness Requirement:
An Invention Must Be Significant
Patents are also not granted for inventions that would have been
obvious to a PHOSITA as of the application filing date.83 While the
novelty requirement ensures that claimed inventions do not already
exist in the prior art, the nonobviousness requirement ensures that
patented inventions are a sufficient improvement over the prior art to
justify the grant of a patent.84 The rationale for not granting patents on
obvious inventions is that these inventions would likely come to be
without the incentive of patent protection.85 Thus, granting patents on
obvious inventions would not actually promote technological progress.
Similar to the novelty requirement, an examiner will determine
if an invention is obvious by comparing the invention to the prior art.
If, in the examiner’s judgement, the invention is not a significant
improvement over the prior art, the examiner will reject the invention
as obvious. Importantly, the nonobviousness requirement is more
rigorous than the novelty requirement for several reasons. First,
multiple prior art references may combine to support an obviousness
rejection, so even if a particular invention has not yet been made and is
unknown, it may still be unpatentable if it is an insignificant change
over the prior art.86 Second, obviousness is judged as of the application
filing date.87 Thus, an invention that is not obvious the day it is made
may become obvious as technology advances between the time when the
invention is made and the filing of the patent application.88 Third, an
examiner determines nonobviousness from the perspective of the
PHOSITA, while presuming that a PHOSITA has knowledge of all
analogous prior art89 and can combine prior art references with

83. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
84. NARD, supra note 17, at 329; see also United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 48 (1966)
(“[N]ovelty and nonobviousness . . . are separate tests of patentability and all must be satisfied in
a valid patent.”).
85. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 155 (2011) (stating
that “[a]n obvious invention will likely soon be made even without the award of a patent right”).
86. NARD, supra note 17, at 351; see also supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text
(discussing the strict identity requirement).
87. Holbrook, supra note 58, at 1472.
88. See id. at 1470 (“The time gap between a prior art disclosure and the validity assessment
means that the knowledge of the PHOSITA has an opportunity to grow.”).
89. See Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (“The person of ordinary skill [for purposes of determining obviousness] is a hypothetical
person who is presumed to be aware of all the pertinent prior art.”). Analogous Prior Art is prior
art that comes from the same field of endeavor or is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem
the invention addresses. NARD, supra note 17, at 401.
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ordinary creativity.90 This allows the examiner some discretion in
determining whether an invention is obvious. Thus, the nonobviousness
requirement is often the biggest hurdle for obtaining a patent.91
3. Disclosing the Invention
Those seeking patent protection in the United States must also
satisfy the three disclosure requirements: (1) written description, (2)
enablement, and (3) best mode.92 The written description requirement
ensures that the scope of patent protection is proportional to the scope
of what the patentee disclosed in the application.93 To satisfy the
written description requirement, the patentee must describe the
invention in enough detail to establish that the patentee possessed the
invention as of the application filing date.94 A written description that
merely renders the invention obvious is insufficient to satisfy the
written description requirement.95 The corollary to this statement,
discussed below,96 is that a prior art disclosure may render an invention

90. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (“A person of ordinary skill is also
a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”).
91. Lack of nonobviousness rejections are the most common rejection at the USPTO. Katrina
Brundage & James Cosgrove, Section 103 Rejections: How Common Are They and How Should You
Respond?, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/10/03/103-rejectionscommon-respond/id=73214/ [https://perma.cc/YL5D-PQEF].
92. These statutory disclosure requirements appear in the first paragraph of § 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated
by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112(a). While the best mode requirement still exists in § 112 under the AIA, it is no
longer a ground for invalidating a granted patent. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose
Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 552 (2012). For this reason, the best mode
requirement has only minor implications for the large-scale AI-generated prior art and is not
analyzed in this Note.
93. NARD, supra note 17, at 138–39.
94. Id. at 551; Holbrook, supra note 20, at 127. However, in a patent law context, possession
does not mean physical possession because the thing being possessed is the intangible idea of the
invention. Id. at 146. Courts have repeatedly stated that actual possession or reduction to practice,
by building a working prototype, is neither necessary nor sufficient for satisfying the written
description requirement. See, e.g., Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (en
banc). Rather, the specification itself must show that the inventor possessed the invention as of
the filing date. Id. at 1351–52 (characterizing written description requirement as “possession as
shown in the disclosure”). Practically, this means that the patentee must describe the invention
and not merely the result the invention produces to satisfy the written description requirement.
Id. at 1350 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
95. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352.
96. See infra Section II.B (discussing how prior art may be insufficient to meet the written
description requirement itself, while still barring patentability for a claimed invention).
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obvious without itself satisfying the written description requirement
for patentability.97
While the written description requirement compels patentees to
describe what the invention is, the enablement requirement compels
patentees to describe how to make and use the invention.98 The
statutory, or patent-supporting,99 enablement requirement of § 112 is
“arguably the most important patent doctrine after obviousness”100 and
is a separate requirement from the written description requirement.101
Enablement ensures that the invention enters the public domain when
the patent expires.102 Like the written description requirement, the
enablement requirement also serves to limit the scope of patent
protection to what the inventor actually teaches in the patent.103
The statutory enablement requirement demands that the
specification of the patent “enable any person skilled in the art . . . to
make and use the [invention].”104 An examiner can reject a patent
application if it fails to teach a PHOSITA either how to make the
invention or how to use the invention.105 Thus, statutory enablement is
97. Cf. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352 (stating that a description that “merely renders the invention
obvious does not satisfy the requirement”).
98. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (requiring a written description of the invention and “of the manner
and process of making and using it”). Although found in the same paragraph, these requirements
are doctrinally separate. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1344.
99. This Note refers to the enablement requirement of § 112 as statutory or patentsupporting enablement, in contrast to anticipatory or patent-defeating enablement discussed in
Section I.C.2.
100. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). To illustrate the difference between written
description and enablement, the court in In re DiLeone provided an example of a disclosure that
would satisfy the enablement requirement but not the written description requirement: “consider
the case where the specification discusses only compound A and contains no broadening language
of any kind. This might very well enable one skilled in the art to make and use compounds B and
C; yet the class consisting of A, B and C has not been described.” 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 n.1 (C.C.P.A.
1971). On the other hand, it is easier to see how an application could satisfy the written description
requirement, while failing the enablement requirement. See, e.g., In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403,
1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (holding that enablement requirement of § 112 was not satisfied because the
disclosure did not teach how to use the invention, although it fully described the invention).
101. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1344.
102. Holbrook, supra note 20, at 128.
103. The scope of the claimed invention in a patent must fall within scope of enablement. Id.
at 157–58; see also Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The scope of enablement, in turn, is that which is disclosed in the specification
plus the scope of what would be known to one of ordinary skill in the art without undue
experimentation.”). The specification is the part of the patent where the inventor describes the
invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
104. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (emphasis added).
105. See In re Hafner, 410 F.2d at 1405 (holding that the requirements of § 112 were not met
because the “how to use” requirement was not satisfied, “though the manner of ‘making,’ as
distinguished from ‘using,’ the invention [was] also fully disclosed”); see also Holbrook, supra note
20, at 127 (noting that the specification must disclose how to make and use the invention). The
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a more stringent requirement than anticipatory enablement, which
applies to prior art, because anticipatory enablement requires only that
a reference enable a PHOSITA to make the described invention to be
prior art.106
The level of teaching that a patent application must provide to
be enabling is the level sufficient to allow a PHOSITA to make and use
the claimed invention without undue experimentation.107 The
enablement analysis, like the nonobviousness analysis, is complex
because it is performed from the perspective of the PHOSITA. 108 Thus,
a patentee can use extrinsic evidence to show what was within the
PHOSITA’s knowledge, 109 which may change over time.110
Further, a reference need only enable a single embodiment of an
invention that falls within the scope of the patent-at-issue to support a
novelty rejection;111 whereas, statutory enablement requires a patent
application to enable the full scope of the claimed subject matter.112
“These differing standards reveal a curious asymmetry”113 that “a
disclosure [may be] entirely adequate to anticipate [an
invention] . . . and, at the same time, entirely inadequate to support the
“use” component can be a crucial distinction for chemical inventions because an inventor cannot
obtain a patent on a chemical compound if there is no known use, even if the inventor invents the
compound and method for making it. Holbrook, supra note 20, at 129.
106. In re Hafner, 410 F.2d at 1405 (“[Section] 112 provides that the specification must enable
one skilled in the art to ‘use’ the invention whereas § 102 makes no such requirement as to an
anticipatory disclosure.”).
107. NARD, supra note 17, at 116 (emphasis added). Courts thus recognize that some
experimentation may be necessary to practice an invention, but a patent is only nonenabling when
the experimentation becomes undue. See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750
F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“That some experimentation is necessary does not preclude
enablement; the amount of experimentation, however, must not be unduly extensive.”).
Courts have identified several factors for determining when experimentation is undue. These
factors include:
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance
presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the
invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the
predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
108. For a deeper discussion of the implications of analyzing enablement from the perspective
of the PHOSITA, see supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.
109. See In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562–63 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (holding that secondary
references could show enablement).
110. See Holbrook, supra note 58, at 1468 (“[I]t is conceivable that a prior art reference that
was not enabled as of its effective prior art date could become enabled over time as the knowledge
of the PHOSITA expands.”).
111. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
112. Compare Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(“[T]he full scope [of the claimed invention] must be enabled . . . .”), with AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac,
344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he applicant’s specification must enable one of ordinary
skill in the art to practice the full scope of the claimed invention.”).
113. Seymore, supra note 12, at 933.
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[issuance of a patent on the invention].”114 As discussed below, AIgenerated disclosures exploit these different standards to preempt
patent protection for desirable inventions and thus inhibit the
disclosure of knowledge that such patents provide, without providing
society with an adequate substitute disclosure.115
D. The Current State of AI-Generated Prior Art
Currently, there are several entities using brute-force
computing power to algorithmically generate disclosures that cover
potentially novel inventions.116 Some entities, like the company Cloem,
market AI-generated prior art as a service to other organizations for
competitive purposes, such as preempting the patents of competitors
and creating freedom to operate around the organization’s own
patents.117 Other organizations, like All Prior Art (“APA”), altruistically
use AI-generated prior art “to democratize ideas, provide an impetus for
change in the patent system, and to preempt patent trolls.”118
Although the current entities trying to use artificial intelligence
to generate prior art have diverse purposes, the underlying AI
technologies that produce the disclosures have several similarities.119
First, these technologies use “linguistic manipulation” to alter text from
existing patents into disclosures covering potentially novel
inventions.120 AI performs this linguistic manipulation using
grammatical algorithms and technical lexicons to create a description

114. In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
115. See infra Section II.B.
116. The two entities primarily focused on in this article are Cloems and All Prior Art.
117. See Benefits, supra note 6 (explaining the offensive and defensive competitive benefits of
using Cloem services).
118. About, supra note 6. A patent troll, or nonpracticing entity, is an entity that
commercializes its patent portfolio by licensing its patents to others rather than practicing the
inventions contained in the patents. J. Jason Williams, Mark V. Campagna & Olivia E. Marbutt,
Strategies for Combating Patent Trolls, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 368 n.1 (2010).
119. See Felix Hamborg, Moustafa Elmaghraby, Corinna Breitinger & Bela Gipp, Automated
Generation of Timestamped Patent Abstracts at Scale to Outsmart Patent-Trolls, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 2ND JOINT WORKSHOP ON BIBLIOMETRIC-ENHANCED INFORMATION RETRIEVAL AND
NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING FOR DIGITAL LIBRARIES 101, 102 (Philipp Mayr, Muthu Kumar
Chandrasekaran & Kokil Jaidka eds., 2017) (describing the similarities and common shortcomings
of All Prior Art, Cloem, and Transform Any Text into a Patent Application).
120. See Hattenbach & Glucoft, supra note 8, at 35–36 (describing the creation of AI-generated
disclosures from existing patent claim language through linguistic manipulation).
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of the physical structure.121 These technologies then timestamp and
publish the disclosures online.122
It is important to see how these AI technologies produce the
disclosures in contrast to how a human would write such disclosure. A
human would first conceive of an idea and would then reduce that idea
into words on a page. In contrast, these AI technologies start with words
on a page. They then use linguistic manipulation to create the final
product—more words on a page. The critical difference is that the AI
never converts the description into anything more than words on a
page. In a sense, the AI creates a description of an invention without
actually “thinking” about the idea or structure it is describing. This
drastically reduces the quality of these AI-generated disclosures.
AI technologies have several other limitations. First, the
technologies are only effective at producing disclosures in certain
technical fields. Cloem’s technology works best with software and
mechanical inventions123 while APA generates disclosures on data
processing systems.124 Further, the generated disclosures are not
syntactically diverse from the base patent language that the
technologies use.125 Lastly, these technologies mostly produce
nonsensical,126 although grammatically correct, disclosures.127 Thus,
these technologies must produce millions of nonsensical disclosures to

121. Features, CLOEM, https://www.cloem.com/flat/features/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/3EW6-NP8Y] (discussing the algorithms and specialized dictionaries that Cloem
uses to create texts). For example, one APA disclosure reads:
A wearable electric device includes a main body with a circuit module inside and at
least a detachable battery strap with a battery module inside, and the main body and
the detachable battery strap are detachably fastened together. The test device includes
an addressable memory. . . . Each of the strips is radially offset from one another. In
the sealing step, long side edges of the battery case are crimped by a forming surface
having a rounded cross section, and arc-shaped edges connecting both long side edges
are crimped by a flat forming surface.
Prior Art, ALL PRIOR ART, http://allpriorart.com/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
4SH8-4ST].
122. See Features, supra note 121 (describing timestamping technology); About, supra note
6 (same).
123. F.A.Q., CLOEM, https://www.cloem.com/flat/faq/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/S32L-FLVE].
124. Hamborg et al., supra note 119, at 102.
125. See id. (stating that the linguistic manipulation techniques of Cloem and APA are not
syntactically diverse).
126. For an example of the nonsensical nature of the claims produced by these technologies
see supra note 121. These claims sound technologically complex and are grammatically correct but
make little sense when one tries to convert the words into a real-world item. Importantly, even if
it would be possible to make the invention described, it is even more difficult to see what the use
or benefit of such invention would be.
127. About, supra note 6; F.A.Q., supra note 123.
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generate a few meaningful disclosures.128 In the near future, though,
the technology for producing AI-generated disclosures will likely
overcome these limitations.
E. The Strategy of Strategic Disclosure
Although AI-generated prior art is revolutionary, publishing
technical information to intentionally create prior art is not a new
concept.129 Many companies publish, or strategically disclose, technical
information to prevent rivals from obtaining patents. 130 Although this
may be socially detrimental if companies merely retain trade secrets
while preventing rivals from obtaining patents,131 strategic disclosure
is beneficial when it expands the domain of public knowledge without
the burden of a patent monopoly.132 Therefore, this Note advocates
for a solution that differentiates between current socially
beneficial strategic disclosures and socially harmful AI-generated
strategic disclosures.
II. THE AVAILABILITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF
AI-GENERATED PRIOR ART
As discussed above, patent law has requirements that a
patentability-defeating prior art reference must meet, although the
requirements for what a patent application must disclose are more
stringent. This Section analyzes why the patent law doctrines discussed
above are incapable of preventing AI-generated disclosures from
rendering some societally beneficial inventions unpatentable. Without
intervention, AI-generated disclosures will stifle the progress of science

128. See About, supra note 6 (asserting that producing millions of these texts increases the
odds of creating potential prior art); F.A.Q., supra note 123 (stating that Cloem produces
thousands of AI-generated patent claims at a time).
129. See Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, Disclosure as a Strategy in the Patent Race, 48
J.L. & ECON. 173, 173–77 (2005) (discussing the methods and purposes of large-scale
“targeted” disclosures).
130. There are companies, such as IP.com and Research Disclosure, that exist specifically to
provide strategic disclosure as a service to other companies. Id. at 173. Other companies, such as
IBM and Xerox, published their own technical journals to prevent other competitors from pursuing
patents in the field of their technology. Id. at 174.
131. See id. at 176 (discussing how firms might use strategic disclosure to disclose enough
information to thwart patents for rivals while retaining the rest of its research as a trade secret).
132. Douglas Lichtman, Scott Baker & Kate Kraus, Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System,
53 VAND. L. REV. 2175, 2199–200 (2000). Indeed, these strategic disclosures often reveal valuable
information, as the PTO has cited thousands of strategic disclosure publications as prior art in
granted patents. See Baker & Mezzetti, supra note 129, at 174 (finding that granted patents have
cited strategic disclosure publications over fifty thousand times).
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because it does not provide an adequate replacement for the knowledge
contained in patent applications or traditional strategic disclosures.
A. Scrutinizing AI-Generated Disclosures Under
the Prior Art Requirements
A court would probably not consider existing AI-generated
disclosures to be prior art because the disclosures are insufficiently
accessible to the public. Additionally, the strict identity requirement
also poses a barrier for AI-generated disclosures to render some
inventions unpatentable under the novelty requirement. But even if AIgenerated disclosures rarely meet the strict identity requirement, they
may still affect the patent system by supporting obviousness rejections.
Further, minor technological leaps may overcome the current
inadequacies of AI in producing prior art.
1. Capturing Knowledge from AI-Generated Disclosures
In determining whether an AI-generated disclosure satisfies the
practical requirements for being patentability-defeating prior art, a
court or examiner would most likely classify these disclosures into the
“printed publications” category of prior art under § 102(a).133 For a
reference to be a printed publication, a court will evaluate whether the
document was publicly accessible by analyzing whether an interested
PHOSITA exercising reasonable diligence could locate it.134 Although
current AI-generated disclosures are available on the internet, they are
unlikely to possess the requisite indexing or context that courts have
examined when determining whether a disclosure was publicly
accessible.135 For example, APA produces vastly unrelated “inventions”
without organizing them by subject matter or in any other “meaningful
way.”136 Yet unlike many “printed publication” cases,137 APA
disclosures are searchable by keyword because they are indexed
133. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
134. Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
135. See supra notes 36–44 and accompanying text (discussing public accessibility).
136. In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also Publications, ALL PRIOR ART,
http://allpriorart.com/publications/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/A72Y-XR5K]. For
example, one volume of the all prior art disclosures displays consecutively inventions for “A
monobloc piston assembly,” “[a]n input display apparatus,” and “a process for reducing the level of
pollutants in the exhaust of a diesel engine” consecutively. Alexander Reben, Volume 1, ALL PRIOR
ART, https://ia800402.us.archive.org/6/items/AllPriorArt/AllPriorArt-Vol1.txt (last visited Dec. 17,
2020) [https://perma.cc/BG7P-RAJP].
137. See, e.g., Cronyn, 890 F.2d at 1161 (finding that student theses indexed alphabetically by
authors name were not sufficiently accessible because indexing bore no relationship to the subject
of the theses).
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in a search engine.138 The court in In re Lister held that
searchability by keyword was enough to make disclosures in a database
printed publications.139
But the database in In re Lister did not contain any nonsensical
entries like APA and Cloem disclosures do.140 Thus, one interested in
the art would have to exercise the incremental degree of diligence
required to filter through nonsensical disclosures when searching for
prior art in APA or Cloem databases. It is possible a court may view
this incremental level of diligence as beyond that of an interested
PHOSITA exercising reasonable diligence.141
Regardless, indexing is only “a relevant factor” for online
publications to be publicly accessible, not “a necessary condition.”142 An
examiner would likely consider other factors.143 For online disclosures
like APA and Cloems, there is no expectation of privacy, and the
disclosures remain online for an extended period of time—both factors
that weigh in favor of the disclosures being printed publications.144 On
the other hand, it is questionable whether the nature of Cloem and APA
disclosures allows for easy copying by those who view them.145 Because
the Cloem and APA disclosures contain nonsensical text, it is more
difficult for a person interested in the art to copy, or “effectively
capture,” 146 the actual knowledge contained in the disclosures.
Examiners would probably also consider the location of AIgenerated disclosures, just as the court in Voter Verified considered that
the disclosure at issue was located on a website specific to the
technology area of the invention and well-known to those in the

138. See What Is Search Engine Indexing?, BRICK MKTG. , https://www.brickmarketing.com/
define-search-engine-index.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/RR3A-PRYH] (“It is
the search engine index that provides the results for search queries . . . .”).
139. In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1314–17 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
140. See About, supra note 6; F.A.Q., supra note 123. The database in In re Lister was a
copyright office database. 583 F.3d at 1310.
141. Courts are often reluctant to consider the actual effort required to find a reference when
determining if a reference was publicly accessible. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
142. Voter Verified, Inc. v. Premier Election Sols., Inc., 698 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
143. Although the “printed publication” in Klopfenstein was a printed publication, it is likely
that a factfinder would still find these factors relevant in deciding whether a disclosure was
publicly accessible. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004). For a discussion of
other factors that courts will consider when deciding if a nontraditional publication is publicly
accessible, see supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 41, 43 and accompanying text (discussing factors in whether nontraditional publication is publicly accessible).
145. Copying in this instance does not mean literal copying but rather the ability to take and
practice the information contained. See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d at 1351. (“The more complex
a display, the more difficult it will be for members of the public to effectively capture
its information.”).
146. Id.
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industry.147 While APA and Cloems generate disclosures only for
mechanical, electrical, and data-processing inventions,148 these fields
are broader than the field—electronic voting technologies—identified
by the court in Voter Verified.149 The broad field of inventions covered
and the volumes of unorganized, nonsensical inventions in collections
of AI-generated disclosures make it unlikely that workers in any
industry would use or value Cloem or APA databases as technical
resources. Thus, even “those interested in the art exercising reasonable
diligence” would have no reason to look for prior art within the
databases of current AI-generated disclosures.150
The recurring issue with current AI-generated disclosures is
that the few valuable disclosures are dispersed among volumes of
nonsensical texts. This makes it difficult to index the inventions by
subject matter because it is impossible to categorize a nonsensical
invention. The amount of nonsensical ideas would also undermine the
legitimacy of AI-generated disclosures as a resource for industry
experts.151 Thus, a person interested in finding such information would
either choose not to, or would have to put forth an unreasonable
amount of effort to, search through existing collections of AIgenerated disclosures.
Looking forward, technological advancements will likely
overcome the issues plaguing current AI-generated disclosures.
Revolutionary deep-learning techniques now allow computers to
imitate human creativity.152 If Cloems and APA utilized these
technologies, the quality of their disclosures would increase. Because
both Cloems and APA publish their disclosures with the intent that
they will constitute patentability-defeating prior art references,153 these
organizations have incentive to develop more advanced AI.
Additionally, as computing power increases, 154 AI-generated
disclosures will become more plentiful, which will result in more AIgenerated disclosures of value. Researchers have estimated that merely
147. 698 F.3d at 1380.
148. See supra notes 123–124 and accompanying text (discussing Cloem and APA and the kind
of disclosures generated).
149. 698 F.3d at 1380.
150. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
151. For an example and discussion of the nonsensical nature of these AI-generated
disclosures, see supra notes 121, 127.
152. See Nina I. Brown, Artificial Authors: A Case for Copyright in Computer-Generated
Works, 20 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2018) (defining deep learning and explaining how
it surpasses traditional AI-coding methods).
153. See supra Section I.D (discussing the current state of AI-generated prior art).
154. Mike Murphy, As Moore’s Law Turns 50, Computer Chips Continue to Get Cheaper and
More Powerful, QUARTZ (Apr. 21, 2015), https://qz.com/387490/as-moores-law-turns-50-computerchips-continue-to-get-cheaper-and-more-powerful/ [https://perma.cc/PUQ4-9QU8].
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improving linguistic manipulation techniques could bring the quality of
current AI-generated disclosures twenty percent closer to the quality of
actual patents.155 Thus, AI-generated disclosures will likely soon meet
the current standards for prior art.
2. Enablement Troubles
Some AI-generated disclosures may very well meet the
anticipatory enablement standard, thus satisfying one of the two
substantive prior art requirements. Current AI-generated disclosures
themselves contain very little teaching,156 but the anticipatory
enablement standard is not enough to prevent these disclosures from
constituting prior art for three reasons. First, the anticipatory
enablement standard requires only that a disclosure enable a PHOSITA
to make the invention.157 Second, a PHOSITA’s knowledge can fill in
any gaps in a disclosure,158 and third, prior art references are presumed
enabling.159 These factors create a risk that AI-generated disclosures
will mistakenly be found enabling.
The key flaw in the anticipatory enablement requirement that
would allow AI-generated disclosures to pass as prior art is that it does
not require a disclosure to enable the PHOSITA to use the described
invention. Under the current anticipatory enablement standard, AIgenerated disclosures are enabling as long as they describe the
invention enough to enable a PHOSITA to make the invention.160 But
because many current disclosure-generating AI technologies use
linguistic manipulation to only describe a physical structure, these
technologies are incapable of identifying a use for the invention.161
These disclosures cannot enable a PHOSITA to use the invention
155. See Hamborg et al., supra note 119, at 105 (providing survey evidence in table one that
modified algorithms can increase the quality of AI-generated claim by twenty percent in relation
to actual patent claims).
156. The disclosures of APA are limited to mere recitations of structure. See supra note 121
(discussing algorithms and dictionaries Cloem uses to create text).
157. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the anticipatory
enablement requirement).
158. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining that a PHOSITA’s knowledge can
fill in the gaps in a disclosure).
159. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (explaining that examiners can presume prior
art references are enabling).
160. See supra notes 55, 106 and accompanying text (discussing the anticipatory
enablement standard).
161. See supra notes 119–121 and accompanying text (discussing similarities among entities
using artificial intelligence). The use that a prior art reference would need to identify would likely
need to be a specific and substantial use, as 35 U.S.C. § 101 requires. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d
1365, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (defining specific utility as not “so general as to be meaningless”
and a substantial utility as “significant and presently available benefit to the public”).
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because the AI cannot teach what it cannot identify.162 Thus, if the
anticipatory enablement standard required a disclosure to enable the
PHOSITA to use an invention, an examiner would likely find current
AI-generated disclosures do not qualify as prior art.
There is actually an increased likelihood that AI-generated
disclosures will meet the anticipatory enablement requirement,
however, because current disclosure-generating AI produces
disclosures only in certain technology fields, like the mechanical and
electrical fields.163 These fields are predictable and require less teaching
to be enabling because a PHOSITA can more easily fill any gaps in the
disclosure using his own knowledge.164 The knowledge of a PHOSITA
can be shown using secondary references, such as the patents that serve
as the base language for current AI-generated disclosures.165 Since AIgenerated disclosures are likely just variations of the original patent
language, the original patent may contain evidence of the PHOSITA’s
knowledge and information about how to practice the invention and
other related inventions.166 Therefore, the original patent could show
that a PHOSITA could make the invention described in the AIgenerated disclosures.167

162. In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1200–01 (Fed. Cir. 1993). For this reason, examiners often
issue rejections for utility and enablement together. MPEP § 2164.07 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017,
Jan. 2017).
163. Cloem’s AI technology works best with mechanical and electrical inventions while APA
claims that they limit their inventions to data processing systems. See supra notes 123–124 and
accompanying text.
164. See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that the requisite disclosure
to enable an invention in a predictable field, like mechanical or electrical inventions, may require
less disclosure than is necessary for an invention, such as a “diverse and relatively poorly
understood group of microorganisms,” which is in an unpredictable field). The scope of enablement
includes the information in the disclosure and information known to the PHOSITA. Nat’l Recovery
Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
165. See supra notes 57–58, 120 and accompanying text (discussing the anticipatory
enablement requirement and creation of disclosures).
166. Indeed, a granted patent must teach a PHOSITA how to make and use the invention or
the patent would not have issued. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (“The specification shall contain . . . the manner
and process of making and using [the invention].” (emphasis added)). The court in In re DiLeone
provided an example of how a patent could enable a PHOSITA to make and use an invention
without even describing that invention: “Consider the case where the specification discusses only
compound A and contains no broadening language of any kind. This might very well enable one
skilled in the art to make and use compounds B and C; yet the class consisting of A, B and C has
not been described.” 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 n.1 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
167. It is important to note that the original patents themselves could not be what enables the
AI-generated disclosure but rather could only show what is within the knowledge of the PHOSITA.
See In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562–63 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (allowing additional references to support
a § 102 rejection for the sole purpose of showing what would have been known or obvious to
a PHOSITA).
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Further, in the Patent & Trademark Office (“PTO”), a prior art
reference receives a presumption of enablement.168 This presents a
challenge to patentees seeking to disqualify AI-generated disclosures as
prior art because the patentee must prove what is not within the
knowledge of the PHOSITA by a preponderance of the evidence. 169 Of
course, the patentee’s failure to meet this standard of proof does not
mean that the prior art reference is actually enabling, but rather, it
simply means that the patentee failed or determined it was not worth
trying to show what a PHOSITA could not do. 170 In such cases, the
presumption of enablement and the burden shifting framework allow
substandard disclosures to be prior art against a patent application.
Thus, AI-generated disclosures may defeat the novelty of some
inventions without themselves enabling a PHOSITA to make and use
the invention.
3. Accuracy by Volume: Achieving Strict Identity
Through Large-Scale Disclosure
In addition to satisfying the practical requirements and the
anticipatory enablement requirement, an AI-generated disclosure must
have strict identity with an invention in order to render the invention
unpatentable for lack of novelty.171 It may seem unlikely that AI could,
by happenstance, produce a disclosure that contains every limitation or
component of a claimed invention arranged as described in the patent
given the infinite number of components and ways to combine them.172
Even using specialized algorithms and existing patent text as a starting
point may not create a high likelihood that a given AI-generated
disclosure will describe an invention that is later the subject of a patent
application.173 As a result, entities like APA and Cloem publish millions

168. See In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 681 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (stating that the appellant must rebut
the presumption of enablement once the PTO cites a disclosure).
169. Id.; see also LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE
OF LAW 458 (4th ed. 2016) (“Proving a negative is difficult . . . .”).
170. See supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text (describing the burden-shifting
framework). See also Seymore, supra note 12, at 939 (stating that this burden-shifting may
continue as each side produces new evidence).
171. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text (discussing the strict
identity requirement).
172. Any current AI-generated disclosures that contain patentable inventions are best
described as occurring by happenstance because, although disclosure-generating AI uses
algorithms to increase the likelihood that a disclosure will describe a patentable invention, many
disclosures do not. See supra notes 120, 127–128 and accompanying text (discussing the large
quantity of nonsensical disclosures produced by technologies to produce a few meaningful ones).
173. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing how technologies
produce disclosures).
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of AI-generated disclosures to increase the chance of anticipating
an invention.174
Yet large-scale publication of AI-generated disclosures is not the
only reason there is an increased chance of strict identity occurring
between AI-generated disclosures and the later claimed inventions. It
is common for a patent application to claim a broad genus175 that may
contain thousands or millions of different embodiments within it. 176 But
a prior art disclosure merely needs to describe one of the potentially
millions of embodiments that falls within a genus claimed in a patent
application to support a lack of novelty rejection.177 This is because a
patent cannot cover any invention embodiment that lacks novelty, or it
would be harming the public by removing knowledge from the public
domain.178 While patentees may be able to overcome these rejections by
narrowing the scope of the claim, narrowing claim scope certainly
reduces the value of the resulting patents because they will offer less
protection.179 Therefore, it is probable that at least some of the millions
of AI-generated disclosures will achieve strict identity with inventions
claimed in patent applications, which in turn will result in narrower
and less valuable patents issuing.
4. Raising the Bar for Nonobviousness
An AI-generated disclosure can support a lack of nonobviousness
rejection under § 103 even if it cannot support a lack of novelty rejection
under § 102 because it lacks anticipatory enablement or strict identity.
Because a factfinder may combine multiple references to form a § 103
rejection, secondary references can supplement AI-generated
disclosures that may not contain each and every limitation of an
invention claimed in a patent application.180 Further, to support a lack
174. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (explaining that millions of nonsensical
disclosures are produced and only a few meaningful ones).
175. In patent law, a genus is a broad category of inventions that may encompass many specific
inventions, called species. See Mike Ervin, Genus and Species, BUS. OF PATS., http://www.thebusiness-of-patents.com/genus-and-species.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
KF2S-7MKT] (explaining the concepts of genus and species in patent law). For example, the term
beverage container is a genus that would cover many species such as a mug, cup, bottle, jug, etc.
176. See Seymore, supra note 12, at 927 n.38 (discussing how savvy drafters can write broad
genus claims that cover millions of species and noting one patent in particular that covers over
one novemdecillion, or 1060 species).
177. MPEP § 2131.02(I) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2017) (citing In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008
(Fed. Cir. 1989)).
178. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
179. See Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J.
ECON. 113, 115 (1990) (discussing the relationship between the scope of a patent and the value of
a patent).
180. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing nonobvious requirement).
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of nonobviousness rejection under § 103, AI-generated disclosures do
not even have to be enabling as long as “the prior art as a whole [is]
enabling.”181 Although an AI-generated disclosure would still need to be
a printed publication to support a § 103 rejection, it would circumvent
many of the § 102 standards that filter out substandard prior art.182
The ability of AI-generated disclosures to support
nonobviousness rejections under § 103 makes it almost certain that
these disclosures will affect the patentability of some inventions. As put
forth by Scott Baker and Claudio Mezzetti, the patentability of
knowledge can be understood using a linear model.183 In this model, the
amount of knowledge already known to the public is quantified as p and
the amount of knowledge that an inventor has is quantified as i.184 For
an inventor to receive a patent on his knowledge, and thus not receive
a rejection under § 103, his knowledge must exceed the knowledge
available to the public by an incremental quantity, ∆. 185 Thus, to get a
patent, i must be equal to or greater than p + ∆.186 However, public
knowledge, p, increases through normal technological advancement.187
Therefore, inventors have to increase the growth rate of i at a rate
greater than the growth rate of p to continue to receive patents.
AI-generated disclosures could increase the growth rate of p and
therefore increase the growth rate of i required to receive a patent. Even
if a single AI-generated disclosure increases public knowledge by only
a trivial amount, the total increase in public knowledge resulting from
millions of AI-generated disclosures would be anything but trivial.
Thus, the value of p will be greater in the presence of AI-generated
disclosures than it would be in its absence. This will inevitably render
some number of inventions obvious and unpatentable as inventors
become unable to increase the growth rate of i to keep up with p. Thus,
inventions that would be patentable in the absence of AI-generated
181. See Seymore, supra note 12, at 939–40 n.104 (emphasis added) (citing Holbrook, supra
note 20, at 171–73) (discussing standard and burden of proof in patenting process). This means
that if multiple references are combined to form an obviousness rejection, no single reference needs
to be enabling so long as all the references combined would enable a PHOSITA to make the
invention without undue experimentation. Id.
182. MPEP § 2141.01 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2017).
183. See Baker & Mezzetti, supra note 13, at 179 (discussing how firms can disclose some
information to thwart rival patents, but also maintain trade secrets).
184. See id. (describing the relationship between nonobviousness, disclosure, and public
knowledge in the context of a two firm patent race).
185. See NARD, supra note 17, at 329 (“[Nonobviousness] demands that the claimed invention
be sufficiently removed from the prior art, meaning in most cases the invention reflects a
leap forward.”).
186. Baker & Mezzetti, supra note 13, at 180.
187. See id. (explaining that strategic disclosure “increase[es] p and rais[es] the threshold of
patentability, p + ∆”).
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disclosures will increasingly become unpatentable as the value of
p increases.
B. Inhibiting the Promotion of the Progress of Science
The use of mass-produced, AI-generated prior art will have a
profound effect on the patent system’s ability to promote the progress
of science.188 Allowing AI-generated disclosures to serve as prior art will
increase prosecution and litigation costs and decrease the value of
patents. As a result, inventors will likely shift to seeking protection
under less societally beneficial trade secret law, which circumvents
patent law’s disclosure function.189 Further, the information contained
in AI-generated disclosures is not an adequate substitute for the
disclosure in patents.
First, mass-produced, AI-generated disclosures will increase
patent prosecution costs by compelling more extensive prior art
searches. Patentees often conduct prior art searches before filing an
application to determine if the likelihood of obtaining a patent justifies
the cost of filing an application.190 Additionally, examiners must
conduct their own prior art search to determine if an invention is truly
novel and nonobvious.191 Searching through masses of AI-generated
disclosures will require more resources to complete a thorough search.
Patentees will bear these costs directly by paying for their own patent
searches and indirectly by paying increased patent application fees the
PTO will use to offset its increased costs. 192 Therefore, even though AIgenerated prior art costs next to nothing to produce,193 it creates large
externalities for patentees that disincentivize inventors from pursuing
patent protection.
Further, AI-generated prior art will increase the costs of
litigating patents because defendants will incur greater costs in
188. The patent system promotes innovation by both incentivizing new inventions and
incentivizing the disclosure of inventions, which allows for follow-on innovations and crosspollination of ideas. Seymore, supra note 21, at 661.
189. See sources cited supra note 13.
190. What Is a Prior Art Search, ELLENOFF GROSSMAN & SCHOLE LLP (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://www.egsllp.com/blog/what-is-a-prior-art-search [https://perma.cc/UQ5Z-VK8U].
191. MPEP § 704.01 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2017).
192. The USPTO charges fees to patentees. Thus, if the cost of examining patents increase,
the USPTO would likely respond by increasing patent application fees and other fees. See U.S.
Pat. & Trademark Off., Letter to Patent Public Advisory Council Regarding Proposed Patent Fees
(Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Letter_from_the_Director_
to_PPAC.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QDM-3FGH] (“The Office’s costs increase along with inflation, and
the proposed five percent increase to most patent-related fees will help keep up with rising costs.”).
193. See About, supra note 6 (“[T]he cost to computationally create and publish millions of
ideas is nearly zero . . . .”).
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searching for and asserting prior art, which plaintiffs will then have to
defend against.194 One common defense strategy in a patent
infringement lawsuit is for a defendant to assert that the patent is
invalid based on prior art.195 To use this defense, a defendant must
search for prior art that could potentially invalidate the claim.196 These
searches contribute heavily to the already high costs of patent
litigation.197 As with patent prosecution, prior art search costs during
litigation will increase as AI produces masses of prior art, and patent
litigators may be required to conduct these searches to exercise due
diligence.198 Further, patent owners will incur increased costs
defending against invalidity challenges based on AI-generated
prior art.
In addition to increasing the costs of prosecuting and litigating
patents, mass-produced, AI-generated prior art will decrease the value
of patents. AI-generated prior art resembles “secret” prior art199 in that
it is difficult to locate, even though it is publicly available.200 The
potential for “secret” AI-generated disclosures to surface and invalidate
patents later in their life increases the uncertainty about the validity of
a patent.201 The resulting uncertainty about patent validity will
194. See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71,
78, 101 (2013) (discussing the defense strategy of asserting invalidity and the accompanying costs).
195. See id. at 78 (“The defendant accused of patent infringement then has two principal
defenses, invalidity and noninfringement . . . .”).
196. Id. at 101.
197. Id. (citing AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011, at
I-153 (2011)).
198. A patent litigator may expose themselves to liability in a malpractice suit if they fail to
complete a thorough check for prior art and assert the affirmative defense of invalidity. See, e.g.,
Cobrin Gittes v. GMIS, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 2296 (BSJ), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10645, at *12–14
(S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1999) (denying summary judgement to a counter-claim defendant that was
alleged to have committed malpractice by conducting an inadequate prior art search that
compromised the counter-claim plaintiffs invalidity defense in a prior patent litigation suit);
Michael J. Canning, Avoid Legal Malpractice – Timely Assert Affirmative Defenses, NAT’L L. REV.
(Oct. 29, 2012), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/avoid-legal-malpractice-timely-assertaffirmative-defenses [https://perma.cc/PA5A-P87T] (asserting that a malpractice suit will likely
result from failing to assert an affirmative defense).
199. “Secret prior art” is a term used to describe prior art, commonly unpublished patent
applications, that may not be available until after the filing date of a patent yet may still be prior
art against the later filed patent. C. Douglas Thomas, Secret Prior Art—Get Your Priorities
Straight!, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 147, 149–50 (1996).
200. Although a court may find that AI-generated disclosures are publicly available for the
purpose of prior art, they may not actually be easy to locate in practice. For an analysis on the
public availability, see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
201. A larger universe of prior art would likely lead to a greater increase in the already large
number of challenges to patent validity. Robert Stoll, Study of the Post Grant Procedures Is Needed
Now, IPWATCHDOG (July 19, 2015), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/07/19/study-post-grantprocedures-now/id=59930/ [https://perma.cc/8KVH-QU96] (finding that, as of 2015, more petitions
for post-grant procedures challenging the validity of a patent had been filed than the USPTO
expected, that these procedures were instituted 70% of the time, and that most claims were found
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ultimately decrease the value of patents and increase transaction costs
in licensing.202 It will also disincentivize inventors from pursuing patent
protection as patents are less valuable and cost more to obtain.
As patent protection loses its appeal, inventors will seek
protection under trade secret law.203 Patentees can receive protection
under trade secret law even if an invention is unpatentable. 204 But
“incentiv[izing] . . . inventors to keep their innovation secret . . . denies
society the benefits of disclosure stemming from the patent system,
which are anathema to trade secrets.”205 The loss to society includes the
ideas contained in the patents, the details on how to make and use the
invention,206 and the potential for follow-on innovation and cross
pollination of ideas.207 Thus, society also suffers the costs created by AIgenerated disclosures.
The disclosure contained in AI-generated disclosures is not an
adequate replacement for the information contained in patent
disclosures. Current AI-generated disclosures often lack information
that would be found in patent applications, like teachings that would

invalid). These high rates of invalidation may be because in some post-grant procedures at the
USPTO, patent claims are not afforded a presumption of validity. Amanda Murphy, Michael
Stramiello, Jonathan Stroud, Stacy Lewis & Tom Irving, Impact of America Invents Act on Biotech
Intellectual Property, 5 COLD SPRING HARBOR PERSPS. MED., Sept. 2015, at 21,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4561394/ [https://perma.cc/HP3J-GULG].
202. See Neal Solomon, The Problem of Patent Valuation, IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 15, 2017),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/08/15/problem-patent-valuation/id=86840/
[https://perma.cc/VZ3G-3AV9] (“By attacking patents in IPRs, the value of patents is diminished
because the risks of patent validity reviews substantially increase transaction costs.”); see also
Liza Vertinsky, Reconsidering Patent Licensing in the Aftermath of Medimmune, 45 HOUS. L. REV.
1609, 1642–43 (2009) (“To the extent that greater opportunity to challenge patents leads to greater
litigation, which has unpredictable outcomes, the transaction costs of doing business using
patented technology will increase.”).
203. Inventors often choose between either patent protection or trade secret protection, so the
weakening of one type of protection will likely push inventors towards the other kind of protection.
See, e.g., John J. Mahon, Jr., Trade Secrets and Patents Compared, 50 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 536, 536
(1968) (comparing patent and trade secrets as two alternative courses for legally protecting
inventions); Leythem Wall & Katherine Banks, Patents and Secrets in the Chemical Industry, 269
MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 32, 32 (2017) (“The choice between keeping proprietary information
secret and applying for patent protection is a key commercial decision, and often the first question
to be asked with any new technology . . . .”).
204. Federally, trade secrets are defined broadly as almost any information that the owner of
the information has taken reasonable measures to maintain secrecy and that “derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the
disclosure or use of the information.” 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A)-(B).
205. TianRui Grp. Co. Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore,
J., dissenting).
206. UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 664–65 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Smith,
J., dissenting).
207. Seymore, supra note 21, at 661.
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enable a PHOSITA to use the invention.208 Further, AI-generated
disclosures could render additional inventions obvious, and thus
unpatentable under § 103, beyond just what is described in the AIgenerated disclosure.209 An AI-generated disclosure could render an
invention obvious without itself containing the written description
necessary to receive a patent.210 This creates an inherent gap between
the information contained in current AI-generated disclosures and the
information provided in patent applications, slowing the progress
of science.211
C. Differentiating AI-Generated Disclosures
from Traditional Strategic Disclosures
So how do AI-generated disclosures, which impose such
externalities on society and the inventor, differ from currently accepted
strategic disclosure practices? Simply put, current AI technologies that
produce AI-generated disclosures lack the ability to comprehend the
ideas that they describe. In contrast, the ideas contained in traditional
strategic disclosures are the result of careful research and analysis,
which injects those ideas into the realm of public knowledge, allows for
the valuation of those ideas, and advances technology. An example is
helpful to illustrate this distinction.
Think of disclosure-generating AI as a monkey on a
typewriter.212 The monkey may type an incredible book, yet to the
monkey, the words are no more than shapes on the page. Unlike a
human author, the monkey does not recognize the value of what it has
created. Even if the monkey’s book resides in a library or is published
208. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (providing an example of deficiencies in an AIgenerated disclosure).
209. Cf. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351–52 (en banc) (discussing
how a description that merely renders an invention obvious is insufficient to meet the written
description requirement). Remember that a reference may render a claimed invention obvious
without actually describing or having strict identity with the claimed invention. See supra note 86
and accompanying text.
210. Cf. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351–52. In Ariad, the court held that a description that “merely
renders the invention obvious does not satisfy the requirement.” Id. at 1352. This implies that a
description can be sufficient to render an invention obvious without meeting the written
description requirement for patentability. This discrepancy has been recognized by others. See,
e.g., In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969); Seymore, supra note 12, at 933.
211. One way that the patent system seeks to promote the progress of science is through the
disclosure of information in publications of issued patents. See supra notes 16–18 and
accompanying text.
212. The idea that a monkey typing on a typewriter might randomly produce something of
value comes from classic proposition of Émile Borel. PRAKASH GORROOCHURN, CLASSIC PROBLEMS
OF PROBABILITY 208–10 (2012). Disclosure-generating AI may be more likely to create something
of value than a monkey on a typewriter, but importantly for the purposes of this illustration,
disclosure-generating AI and a monkey both are unable to comprehend what they actually produce.
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on the internet, it does not have value until someone comes along, reads
it, and discovers its value. That is the point at which the information
would actually enter the realm of public knowledge, but under current
patent doctrines, the book will still be prior art as of the date it appeared
in the library (given other requirements are met).213
The importance of the comprehension and recognition of prior
art is underrecognized because it exists inherently in traditional prior
art. People rarely sit down, randomly type on a keyboard, and publish
the result. Rather, they conduct research, test various solutions, and
condense the results into a publication.214 The process of researching,
testing, and analyzing has a filtering effect that, although imperfect,215
separates more valuable ideas from less valuable ones. This allows
inventors and society to focus resources on developing the ideas that are
most likely to produce long-term value. Without separating between
superior and inferior inventions, there is no way to efficiently
allocate resources.
In short, although many prior art requirements exist, the
advancement of AI technology coupled with weak prior art
requirements will permit AI-generated disclosures to render deserving
inventions unpatentable. As a result, the incentives for inventors to
invent and disclose new technologies will decrease as prosecution and
litigation costs increase and patent value decreases. Meanwhile, those
in the best position to utilize the information contained in AI-generated
disclosures will have to struggle through the disarray of AI-generated
disclosures without an efficient way to separate the wheat from
the chaff.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING AI-GENERATED DISCLOSURES
To ensure inadequate AI-generated disclosures do not render
otherwise novel inventions unpatentable, the patentability assessment
must undergo several changes. First, prior art should satisfy a
213. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899–900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that general library
procedures for indexing, cataloging, and shelving a thesis were conclusive evidence that the
reference was prior art prior to the critical date of the patent).
214. See Akweli Parker, You Have an Idea for an Invention . . . Now What?, HOWSTUFFWORKS,
https://science.howstuffworks.com/innovation/inventions/you-have-an-idea-for-an-invention-nowwhat1.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/3HGA-GERR] (discussing how many
inventors write down or make auditory recordings of their ideas, take lots of notes on their work,
or record experimental results).
215. Many ideas are not appreciated by society at large in their time; however, at least some
people must appreciate the value of these inventions in order to continue to pursue their
development. See Clinton Nguyen, 7 World-Changing Inventions That Were Ridiculed when They
Came Out, BUS. INSIDER, (Aug. 2, 2016, 12:55 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/inventionsthat-were-ridiculed-2016-8 [https://perma.cc/LP4T-GCYK].
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conception requirement before it can invalidate a patent. Second, AIgenerated disclosures should not receive the presumption of
enablement, and the party asserting the AI-generated disclosure as
prior art should have the burden of showing that it is enabling.
A. Conception of the Knowledge in AI-Generated Disclosures
Implementing a conception requirement for prior art will ensure
that AI-generated disclosures have actually contributed to public
knowledge and have undergone some evaluation before they can render
an invention unpatentable. Before the enaction of the Leahy Smith
America Invents Act (“AIA”), conception was a significant doctrine in
patent law.216 The PTO defines conception as “the complete
performance of the mental part of the inventive act and . . . the
formation in the mind of the inventor of a definite and permanent idea
of the complete and operative invention as it is thereafter to be applied
in practice.”217 For conception to occur, there must be “contemporaneous
recognition and appreciation of the invention.” 218 However, conception
does not mean that the inventor knows that the invention will work or
is patentable.219
A factfinder would apply a conception requirement similarly to
other substantive prior art requirements. For example, when an
examiner analyzes whether a reference satisfies the prior art
requirements, he would make an additional determination of whether
conception of the disclosure had occurred. Proof of conception would
vary for different types of prior art. Any form of reduction to practice
would be proof of conception because reduction to practice necessarily

216. Pre-AIA, if two inventors filed an application for the same invention, the inventor who
submitted the application later could receive priority over the earlier-filing inventor if he could
prove that he conceived of the invention first and worked diligently to reduce the invention to
practice. See MPEP § 2138.01(I) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2017). The rules surrounding the firstto-invent system will remain relevant until approximately 2034. Murphy et al., supra note 201,
at 1.
217. MPEP § 2138.04 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, June 2020) (quoting Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d
292, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1930)). Courts have given similar definitions for conception throughout the
twentieth century and into the twenty-first century. See, e.g., Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal
Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (using the discussed definition of conception);
Hitzeman v. Rutter, 243 F.3d 1345, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr
Lab’ys, Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994)) (same).
218. MPEP § 2138.04(II) (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, June 2020) (citing Silvestri v. Grant, 496 F.2d
593, 596 (C.C.P.A. 1974); Invitrogen, Corp. v. Clontech Lab’ys, Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1064 (Fed. Cir.
2005); Langer v. Kaufman, 465 F.2d 915, 918 (C.C.P.A. 1972)).
219. Id. (citing Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1228; Dow Chem. Co. v. Astro-Valcour, Inc., 267 F.3d
1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
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requires recognition and appreciation for an invention.220 Thus, patents
and patent applications would satisfy the conception requirement per
se because filing a patent application constitutes a constructive
reduction to practice.221 Further, producing a physical or tangible
embodiment of an invention, which constitutes actual reduction to
practice, would also be proof of conception.222
A conception requirement would make a difference mostly in the
prior art class of printed publications. The examiner would look for
evidence of conception in the circumstances surrounding the
publication. Publications like journal articles would certainly satisfy
the conception requirement, as the author and editors would
necessarily recognize and appreciate the invention when writing and
reviewing the article. A similar analysis would occur with internet
sources like blog posts that could be traced back to a person. To prevent
AI-generated blog posts from passing through, a factfinder would need
to treat disclosures that cannot be traced back to a person as AIgenerated disclosures.223
An AI-generated disclosure alone would not satisfy the
conception requirement. AI-generated disclosures would require
further proof of conception either by evidence that a person reviewed
the disclosure and recognized the described invention or by evidence
that the AI itself was able to recognize and appreciate the idea. It is
important to note that recognition only means that the invention
underwent some evaluation, not that the assessed value was correct.
Evidence that a person has recognized and appreciated the invention in
an AI-generated disclosure could be in the form of a written analysis or

220. Reduction to practice is a patent law term of art referring to the moment when the
inventive process is complete. NARD, supra note 17, at 246. Reduction to practice can come in two
forms: (1) constructive reduction to practice by filing a patent application that satisfies the § 112
requirements or (2) actual reduction to practice by constructing the invention and testing that it
works. Id.; MPEP § 2138.05(I)-(II) (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, June 2020).
221. MPEP § 2138.05(IV) (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, June 2020) (citing Estee Lauder Inc. v. L’Oreal
S.A., 129 F.3d 588, 593 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
222. See id. § 2138.05(II). One important exception to the general rule that reduction to
practice would show conception would be when AI generates a design that it then 3D prints. This
is certainly a possibility as AI is already assisting in 3D printing. See Lucie Gaget, Artificial
Intelligence and 3D Printing: Meet the Future of Manufacturing, SCULPTEO (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://www.sculpteo.com/blog/2018/10/24/artificial-intelligence-and-3d-printing-meet-the-futureof-manufacturing/ [https://perma.cc/EX6T-2KRP] (discussing the present and future roll of AI in
3D printing). Such a reference would still require further evidence that the AI was able to recognize
and appreciate the design produced in order to qualify as prior art. See infra note 224 and
accompanying text.
223. It is not unthinkable that AI could be used to develop fake blog posts. Chris O’Brien, AIGenerated Fake Content Could Unleash a Virtual Arms Race, VENTUREBEAT (Nov. 11, 2019, 5:36
AM), https://venturebeat.com/2019/11/11/ai-generated-fake-content-could-unleash-a-virtual-arms
-race/ [https://perma.cc/64YS-Y3SC].
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an actual reduction to practice of the idea. Proof of AI conception could
be in the form of computer-simulated tests of the invention.224
Implementing a conception requirement would offer several
benefits to both patentees and society. First, a conception requirement
would prevent substandard prior art from rendering deserving
inventions unpatentable—inventions that may only come to existence
because of the incentive of a patent monopoly.225 Prior art that has not
undergone conception is inherently substandard because it has not
contributed any value to society. This is because, as discussed in the
monkey example above,226 until conception occurs, an invention cannot
be evaluated, categorized, built, commercialized, or innovated upon.
But prior art that has undergone conception has passed through the
knowledge filters of recognition and appreciation that help expose
valuable ideas that could be pursued further. Additionally, inventors
will more easily be able to find ideas that have undergone conception,
which prevents inventors from repeating work and drives more creative
innovation for which inventors can receive patents. Thus, a conception
requirement prevents AI-generated disclosures from decreasing the
incentive for inventors to develop new knowledge without providing an
equivalent alternative source of knowledge.
Further, because the conception requirement is not a blanket
exclusion on using AI-generated disclosures as prior art, it provides
incentives for programmers to develop advanced AI that is more
beneficial to society. The AI revolution is the first time in the history of
the patent system that a new source of prior art will develop.227 Thus, a
unique opportunity exists for the patent system to shape prior art
rather than conform to the existing forms of prior art. This allows the
patent system “[t]o promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts”
in a new way.228

224. See generally Eric Winsburg, Computer Simulations in Science, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL.
(Sept. 26, 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simulations-science/#SimExp [https://perma.cc
/D38R-4UTK] (discussing the operation and capabilities of computer simulations and experiments,
which if conducted by AI on inventions contained in AI-generated disclosures, could be sufficient
to satisfy a conception requirement).
225. The nonobvious standard limits the grant of patents to only those inventions that would
not come about without the incentive provided by a patent. See supra note 85 and accompanying
text. Thus, if an AI-generated disclosure were to render an otherwise patentable invention
unpatentable, it would eliminate the patent incentive and some inventions may never come into
existence as a result.
226. See supra Section II.C.
227. Other forms of prior art mentioned in § 102 like public uses, sales, patents, and humangenerated publications were around long before the patent system’s birth in 1793. 35 U.S.C
§ 102(a)(1); see also Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (creating the earliest predecessor to the
current U.S. patent system).
228. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

2021]

USING AI TO MASS PRODUCE PRIOR ART

557

Another advantage of the conception requirement is the ease of
implementation. Most of the substantive requirements for prior art are
judicially developed doctrines.229 Because the conception requirement
would be similar to these existing doctrines, it would likely take only a
decision from the Federal Circuit to introduce the requirement.230 The
requirement could be statutorily justified under the AIA, which states
that prior art includes anything that is “available to the public,” on the
grounds that conception is a prerequisite to public availability.231
Further, there is already an abundance of case law defining
conception.232 Thus, this requirement would not create much
uncertainty for practitioners and, even once implemented, would begin
to change case outcomes only as AI-generated prior art becomes
more common.
These benefits would come at a cost. While case law on
conception is abundant, the evidence needed to prove conception for AIgenerated disclosures may be uncertain. Further, the types of evidence
needed to show conception for an AI-generated disclosure may only be
accessible to AI owners and not the defendants and patent examiners
asserting the prior art.233 This could increase discovery costs and create
uncertainty as the evidentiary laws develop.
Further, as most prior art is discovered during patent
prosecution, patent examiners would assume the burden of showing
that prior art meets the conception requirement. 234 This burden on
patent examiners could increase the costs of patent prosecution and the
pendency of patent applications. There may be some irony, however, in
that AI may help alleviate any burden that the conception requirement
creates for patent examiners. Some have proposed that AI could help
229. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing the relevant judicial doctrines).
230. The Federal Circuit has nationwide jurisdiction over all appeals in patent cases filed in
federal district courts and from decisions of the U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board. Court
Jurisdiction, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/courtjurisdiction (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/K69S-QKV5]. Nearly 67% of the cases
heard by the Federal Circuit involve patent disputes. Id. Thus, the Federal Circuit has an
incredible amount of influence over the development of patent law jurisprudence.
231. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). The Supreme Court has held that this language, which the AIA
introduced, was not an attempt to change the well settled common-law doctrines surrounding prior
art. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 630 (2019). Thus, public
accessibility is still a “touchstone” of determining whether a disclosure is available as prior art.
See sources cited supra note 36. Therefore, the statute language could justify a conception
requirement as a prerequisite for public accessibility.
232. See supra notes 216–218 and accompanying text (providing relevant examples).
233. For proposed types of evidence of conception for AI-generated disclosures, see supra note
220 and accompanying text.
234. Only 1.5% of patents are ever litigated, while examiners compare every patent to the prior
art during examination. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 75, 75, 79 (2005).
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examiners handle their dockets by performing tasks like prior art
searches.235 This would allow examiners to focus on inspecting the
quality of prior art. Thus, as examiners have more time to consider and
examine the prior art under the proposed requirements, there should
ultimately be an increase in the quality of the patents issued. 236
B. Removing the Presumption of Enablement
Prior art, or at least AI-generated prior art, should not receive
the presumption of enablement.237 Rather, the party asserting a prior
art reference should have to show that it is enabling because they are
the least-cost avoider for producing the evidence.238 Once the proponent
of the prior art reference has met this burden, the opposing party may
then offer evidence to rebut the proponent’s showing of enablement. The
burden could still shift back and forth, but the ultimate burden to show
that the prior art is enabling would still be on the proponent.239 Further,
under this proposal, the standard for anticipatory enablement would
not change. Prior art would need to enable a PHOSITA only to make,
rather than make and use, a prior art invention in order to satisfy the
anticipatory enablement requirement.240 Additionally, like the
235. See Udi Cohen, Artificial Intelligence Will Help to Solve the USPTO’s Patent Quality
Problem, IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 23, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/11/23/artificialintelligence-will-help-solve-usptos-patent-quality-problem/id=116302/
[https://perma.cc/PS4ZJWMJ] (discussing how AI will help increase the efficiency of the patent application review process
by helping examiners conduct prior art searches).
236. The poor quality of issued patents is a major issue. Based on invalidation rates by courts,
the estimated number of patents that are invalid in whole or in part may be as high as forty to
forty-five percent. See Josh Landau, A Little More Than Forty Percent: Outcomes at the PTAB,
District
Court,
and
the
EPO,
PAT.
PROGRESS
(May
1,
2018),
https://www.patentprogress.org/2018/05/01/a-little-more-than-forty-percent/
[https://perma.cc/4U2U-LASG] (analyzing patent invalidation rates at the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board and the European Patent Office).
237. Other academics have suggested eliminating the presumption that prior art references
are enabling as a way to restrict insufficient prior art in other contexts. See supra Seymore, note
12, at 959–60 (arguing for eliminating the presumption of enablement and restricting what
secondary references can show that prior art is enabling as a way of preventing inadequate prior
art from rendering an invention unpatentable).
238. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing issues associated with proving
a negative).
239. Under the current regime, while the proponent of the prior art disclosure receives a
presumption that it is enabling, she still carries the ultimate burden of showing enablement. See
In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[P]reponderance of the evidence is the standard
that must be met by the PTO in making rejections . . . .”). This would not change under the
new regime.
240. Although changing the anticipatory enablement standard to require that prior art enable
a PHOSITA to make and use the invention contained in a prior art disclosure, current
shortcomings with the utility requirement of § 101 make a use requirement in anticipatory
enablement undesirable. For a discussion of nominal utility and other shortcomings of the utility
requirement, see Nathan Machin, Comment, Prospective Utility: A New Interpretation of the Utility
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conception requirement, the Federal Circuit could probably eliminate
the presumption of enablement without legislative intervention by
overturning its own precedent.241
By eliminating the presumption of enablement, nonenabling AIgenerated disclosures will no longer be able to pass as enabling merely
because of the difficulty of proving that they are nonenabling.242
Further, either the AI-generated disclosure itself or secondary
references 243 must affirmatively show that the AI-generated disclosure
would enable a PHOSITA to make the described invention. Even if the
disclosure contained a method of making the contained invention, the
disclosure would not receive a presumption of enablement. The
proponent of the disclosure would still need to show that the method in
the AI-generated disclosure is enabling.
One benefit of eliminating the presumption of enablement is
that it will incentivize programmers to create more robust techniques
for AI-generation of disclosures. Requiring AI-generated disclosures to
prove enabling will require better AI techniques to generate the more
robust disclosures, or alternatively, persons could supplement the AIgenerated disclosures with additional text to satisfy the anticipatory
enablement requirement.244 Like the addition of the conception
requirement, eliminating the presumption of enablement is not a
blanket exclusion on AI-generated disclosures. Rather, it incentivizes
creating more powerful AI, which indirectly furthers patent law’s
purpose of “promot[ing] the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts.”245

Requirement of Section 101 of the Patent Act, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 421, 433–35 (1999) (discussing how
the utility requirement of § 101 is so low that it may be satisfied with merely a nominal utility).
241. Although patents enjoy a statutory presumption of enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 282,
other printed publications do not. Yet courts still apply a presumption of enablement to nonpatent
references. See In re Antor Media Corp., 689 F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that the
presumption of enablement applied to nonpatent publications). Thus, the Federal Circuit could
take a step back and eliminate this presumption. See also supra notes 229–230 and accompanying
text (discussing the ease of implementing a conception requirement).
242. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties associated with the
burden of proving a negative).
243. The scope of enablement would still only include what is in the disclosure and what is
within the knowledge of a PHOSITA. Thus, secondary references could only show what was within
the knowledge of a PHOSITA. For a discussion of the current use of secondary references in
showing enablement, see supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.
244. Supplementing the prior art disclosure using human generated texts could also be one
way of satisfying the conception requirement. See supra note 220 and accompanying text
(discussing how AI-generated prior art could satisfy conception).
245. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Further, eliminating the presumption of enablement will ensure
that prior art itself contributes to the advancement of technology before
it renders deserving inventions unpatentable.246 The details of the
invention, like how to make and use the invention, are what a patent
provides as consideration in the patent law quid pro quo.247 In contrast,
the quid pro quo inherent in strategic disclosure is that an inventor will
publicly disclose some details of the invention in exchange for the PTO
not granting a patent to anyone else.248 The party seeking to
strategically disclose an invention, however, should still provide some
benefit to society through this exchange.249 The basic description of the
physical structure of an invention in current AI-generated disclosures
does not provide enough benefit to society to justify the strategic
disclosure quid pro quo. Thus, eliminating this presumption will
guarantee that society receives valuable information either through
strategic disclosure or a patent application.
The costs of eliminating the presumption of enablement, like
implementing a conception requirement, include burdening patent
examiners.250 Unlike a conception requirement, removing the
presumption of enablement would increase an examiner’s workload
with respect to every reference they cite against a patent application.
Because it is common to assert multiple prior art references against a
single patent application,251 the burden of showing that prior art is
enabling may multiply several times in a single rejection. If this were a
substantial burden on patent examiners, it may increase the patent
prosecution costs and patent application pendency. Both represent costs
that may pass to patentees who must pay patent filing fees252 or who

246. For a discussion of how unenabled prior art may pass through the anticipatory
enablement requirement, see supra Sections I.B.2 and II.A.2.
247. UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 664–65 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Smith, J.,
dissenting) (“It is the details of how to make and use an invention that are of value in the
patent disclosure.”).
248. Lichtman et al., supra note 132, at 2177 (discussing how a competitor may publish a
strategic disclosure in order to prevent an inventor from receiving patent protection).
249. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (discussing current burdens experienced by
patent inspectors).
251. Dennis
Crouch,
References
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PATENTLY-O
(Nov.
21,
2016),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/11/references-cited.html [https://perma.cc/78L9-EE2L] (stating
that the average patent issued in 2016 has over fifty references cited against it).
252. See supra note 192 (discussing how the PTO could pass off future costs to patentees).
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receive patents with shorter enforceable terms.253 Thus, while these
requirements would protect some patentees from having their
inventions rendered unpatentable, all patentees would bear the
financial burden.
One way to alleviate some of this burden is to eliminate the
presumption of enablement for only nonpatent disclosures. For patents
that have already issued, a patent examiner has presumably previously
found that the patent would enable a PHOSITA to make and use the
disclosed invention.254 Requiring patent examiners to repeat the work
of their colleagues would be wasteful and show disdain for the patent
examination process. Thus, allowing the presumption of enablement to
remain with respect to issued patents would reduce some of the burden
on patent examiners and would be consistent with the statutory
requirement that patents are valid.255 Additionally, like with the
conception requirement, AI could play a role in alleviating the burden
on patent examiners during prosecution.256
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the patent system is to incentivize inventors to
develop and disclose inventions by providing a patent monopoly. Massproduced, AI-generated disclosures, however, are threatening to defeat
the patentability of deserving inventions and thus the incentive for
inventors to develop and disclose their invention. These AI-generated
disclosures are poor substitutes for the information provided by patent
applications. Current patent law doctrines are ill-equipped to handle
the unique problems associated with AI-generated disclosures. By
creating a conception requirement and eliminating the presumption of
enablement for AI-generated disclosures, the patent system will be able
to exclude substandard AI-generated disclosures from serving as prior

253. The current patent term is 20 years from the earliest effective filing date. Patent Term
Adjustment: Everything You Need to Know, UPCOUNSEL, https://www.upcounsel.com/patent-termadjustment (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/GGT2-5724]. Thus, time spent
prosecuting a patent results in a shorter life of enforceability. See id. (stating that Congress found
that patent prosecution delays were eating into the lifespan of patents). However, patent term
adjustments, granted for certain delays at the patent office, may reduce the impact of increased
pendency. Id.
254. To issue, a patent must enable a PHOSITA to make and use the claimed invention. 35
U.S.C. § 112(a).
255. 35 U.S.C. § 282.
256. See supra note 235–236 and accompanying text (discussing specific uses for AI as a
burden alleviator).
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art, which preserves the incentive for inventors to pursue patent
protection while creating an incentive for programmers to develop more
robust AI capable of producing information-rich disclosures. Thus, this
Note proposes a solution that helps maximize technological
advancement by stimulating AI-driven and human-driven innovation.
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